radical antinormativity

“Unlike several of Reagan’s social conservative advisors, Posner and Philipson were vehemently opposed to any revival of the old public health tradition and its paternalist measures. In their view, normative judgments about sexual deviance or perversion were counterproductive to the smooth functioning of markets: as a quasi-market replete with shadow prices, the arena of sexual trades functioned most efficiently when it was free from the state regulations of quarantine or mandatory testing. Michel Foucault was one of the first to point to the radical antinormativity of the Chicago school neoliberals; just as they rejected the disciplinary and regulatory institutions of the twentieth-century welfare state as so many barriers to the efficient functioning of market logics, neoliberal theorists such as Friedman, Becker, and Posner were methodologically indifferent to the normative categories of the twentieth-century social sciences and their allied disciplines. They thus found themselves somewhat unexpectedly aligned with the New Left.” (Melinda Cooper, Family Values, pp.169-170)


norms in the eye of the beholder

“On the broadly phenomenalist line about norms that will be defended here, norms are in an important sense in the eye of the beholder, so that one cannot address the question of what implicit norms are, independently of the question of what it is to acknowledge them in practice. The direction of explanation to be pursued here first offers an account of the practical attitude of taking something to be correct-according-to-a-practice, and then explains the status of being correct-according-to-a-practice by appeal to those attitudes.” (Robert B. Brandom, Making It Explicit, p.25)

de dicto ascriptions and de re ascriptions

De dicto ascriptions specify the content of the attributed commitment from the point of view provided by what the one to whom that commitment is attributed would, according to the attributor, acknowledge. De re ascriptions specify the content of that same commitment from the point of view provided by what the one attributing the commitment would acknowledge. These are two different sorts of ascription, two ways of specifying the content of a single commitment, not ascriptions of two different sorts of belief or commitment.” (Robert B. Brandom, Making It Explicit, p.584)

inferential articulation and social articulation

“For information (whether true of false) to be communicated is for the claims undertaken by one interlocutor to become available to others (who attribute them) as premises for inferences. Communication is the social production and consumption of reasons. So communication (giving and asking for reasons) involves the interaction of the inferential articulation of contents that is at the center of the semantics presented here and the social articulation of discursive commitments that is at the center of the pragmatics presented here. The nature and significance of this interaction of the inferential and the social dimensions of discursive practice is a large and important topic. . . . As a result, the contents of the claims that are deployed monologically in intrapersonal reasoning in soliloquy must be understood as having been conferred by public practices of deploying claims dialogically in interpersonal reasoning in conversation. Meditation is made possible by disputation.” (Robert B. Brandom, Making It Explicit, p.474)

ascriptional locutions

“The attribution of discursive commitments is an attitude that is implicit in deontic scorekeeping practices. It is something that scorekeepers do. The introduction of a sentential operator that functions as “S believes that . . .” or “S is committed to the claim that . . .” does in English makes it possible, not merely implicitly or in practice to take someone to be committed to a claim, but explicitly to say that someone is committed to a claim, and to which claim. The explicit is the claimable, what can be given as a reason and have reasons demanded for it; ascriptional locutions make implicit attributions explicit as the contents of claims.” (Robert B. Brandom, Making It Explicit, p.498)

anaphoric chains

“Anaphoric chains running through bits of discourse are not naturalistic features of them like which organism produces the tokening, or when or where it is produced. They are normative features attributed to the discourse by deontic scorekeepers, matters of conditional commitment or commitment inheritance—of the obligation that the significance assigned to, or score kept on, one part of the discourse answer in systematic ways to the significance assigned to, or score kept on, another.” (Robert B. Brandom, Making It Explicit, p.460)


“As Frege indicates in the Grundlagen, sortals are like predicates, except that they have not only criteria and consequences of application but (like singular terms) also criteria (and so consequences) of identity. For many purposes, ‘. . . is a dog’ functions predicatively, just as ‘. . . is large’ does. But if a is a dog and b is a dog, it makes sense to ask whether a is the same dog as b. Sortals have associated with them practices of identifying and individuating the things they apply to, as nonsortal predicates do not.” (Robert B. Brandom, Making It Explicit, p.437)